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Holding elections has become a global norm. Unfortunately, the integrity of
elections varies strongly, ranging from “free and fair” elections with genuine
contestation to “fac¸ade” elections marred by manipulation and fraud.
Clearly, electoral integrity is a topic of increasing concern. Yet electoral
integrity is notoriously difficult to measure, and hence taking stock of the
available data is important. This article compares cross-national data sets
measuring electoral integrity. The first part evaluates how the different data
sets (a) conceptualize electoral integrity, (b) move from concepts to
indicators, and (c) move from indicators to data. The second part analyses
how different data sets code the same elections, seeking to explain the
sources of disagreement about electoral integrity. The sample analysed
comprises 746 elections in 95 third and fourth wave regimes from 1974
until 2009. I find that conceptual and measurement choices affect
disagreement about election integrity, and also find that elections of lower
integrity and post-conflict elections generate higher disagreement about
election integrity. The article concludes with a discussion of results and
suggestions for future research.
Keywords: elections; democratization; electoral integrity; electoral fraud;
measurement
1. Introduction
In the wake of the third wave of regime transitions and the subsequent democrati-
zations following the end of the Cold War, elections spread to Latin America,
Eastern Europe, former Soviet republics, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia.1 With
the recent Arab Spring, over 90% of the world’s states now select their national
leaders through elections.2 However, the integrity of these elections varies
widely: ranging from “free and fair” elections with genuine contestation to
“fac¸ade” elections marred by manipulation and fraud. While global norms for elec-
tions increasingly converged,3 global practice shows a widely varying “menu of
manipulation”.4
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Clearly, research on electoral integrity is increasingly relevant, and important
advancements in conceptualizing and measuring electoral integrity have been
made.5 However, due to the covert nature of fraud and the complexity of electoral
processes, electoral integrity is very difficult to measure. Hence evaluating the val-
idity and reliability of existing data is important. This article takes stock of the
available cross-national data sets and compares 11 data sets measuring electoral
integrity in various regions of the world.6
The article is set up as follows. The first section describes and evaluates how
the different data sets (a) conceptualize electoral integrity, (b) move from concepts
to indicators, and (c) move from indicators to data.7 The following section analyses
how different data sets code the same elections, seeking to explain the sources of
disagreement between different data sets. The article concludes with a discussion
of results and suggestions for future data collection on electoral integrity.
2. Evaluating data sets on electoral integrity: conceptualization and
measurement
This section discusses how different data sets conceptualize and measure elec-
toral integrity. Following the three phases identified by Adcock and Collier,
the first part of this section describes how the different data sets conceptualize
electoral integrity, the following part discusses operationalization (from concepts
to indicators), and the last part evaluates the data collection process (from indi-
cators to data). The evaluation is based on two standards of assessment: validity
and reliability. Validity is defined as whether the measurements used actually
capture the phenomenon of interest, that is, whether the three phases of concep-
tualization, operationalization, and data collection result in data that “measure
what they are supposed to measure”.8 Reliability is defined as the extent to
which the data collection process produces the same results on repeated trials
(and hence only applies to the last phase).9 Table 1 provides an overview of
the standards of assessment.
In Section 2.1 on conceptualization, the core question is what criteria authors
use to conceptualize electoral integrity: are these criteria that are explicit, can be
validly measured, and are cross-nationally comparable? Here key challenges to
validity are that some criteria cannot be validly measured and that criteria are
not always made explicit. Section 2.2 subsequently evaluates whether concepts
of electoral integrity are operationalized in terms of more specific conceptual attri-
butes, as this enables measurement of electoral integrity using multiple and clearly
specified indicators. Here, the key challenge to validity is that several data sets skip
this step, and use a broad definition of electoral integrity that is measured with a
single overall indicator.10 Finally, Section 2.3 evaluates data collection, discussing
the selection of sources, measurement level, and coding. Here, the key challenge to
validity is the sources used to gather data on electoral integrity, which may bias
measurements in various ways.
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2.1 Conceptualizing electoral integrity
What does it mean to “get elections right”?11 In recent years, various conceptual-
izations emerged, as Table 2 shows.12 These conceptualizations differ in three
aspects: first, whether election integrity is defined positively or negatively,
second, whether election integrity is defined using particular or universal criteria,
and finally, whether election integrity is defined using a process or concept-based
approach.13
First, conceptualizations differ in defining election integrity positively, by spe-
cifying the presence of criteria (or fulfilment of norms) for democratic elections, or
negatively, by identifying the absence of criteria (or norm-violations) that render
elections less-than-democratic or plainly un-democratic.14 Positive definitions
use terms ranging from free and fair elections, clean elections, and democratic elec-
tions to election quality and electoral integrity.15 Conversely, negative definitions
refer to flawed elections, electoral malpractice or misconduct, electoral manipu-
lation, fraud, or corruption, and election rigging.16 An example of a positive defi-
nition is Munck’s conceptualization of democratic elections:
Table 1. Evaluating data sets on electoral integrity: conceptualization, operationalization,
data collection.
Challenge Task Standard of assessment
Conceptualization Define criteria to distinguish clean and
flawed elections (either/or) or
elections of varying integrity
(matter of degree)
Criteria can be validly
measured
Define attributes and components of
attributes that constitute the concept
Criteria are cross-nationally
comparable
Criteria are explicit
Operationalization Selection of indicators Multiple indicators?
If multiple indicators, define: If yes,
† Scope Avoid maximalist and
minimalist concepts
† Internal consistency Avoid redundancy and
conflation
† Weighting of indicators Weighting theoretically
justified?
† Aggregation of indicators Weighting reflected in
aggregation choices?
Data collection Selection of sources Multiple sources?
Selection of measurement level Measurement level matches
information in sources?
Organization of coding process Multiple coders?
Clear coding scales?
Data and information on
coding process publicly
available?
716 C. van Ham
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Table 2. Different approaches to conceptualizing election integrity.
Author(s)
Conceptualization
Concept-name
Positive/
negative
Universal/
particular
Process/
concept
Hermet et al. (1978) Elections without
choice
Negative Universal Concept
Elklit & Svensson
(1997)
Free and fair
elections
Positive Universal Concept &
process
Anglin (1998) Free and fair
elections
Positive Universal Process
Pastor (1999) Flawed elections Negative Particular Concept
O’Donnell (2001) Democratic
elections
Positive Universal Concept
Mozaffar &
Schedler (2002)
Electoral
governance
Neutral Universal Process
Schedler (2002,
2013)
Electoral
manipulation
Negative Universal Concept &
process
Schmeets (2002) Free and fair
elections
Positive Universal Concept &
process
Lehoucq (2003) Electoral fraud Negative Particular Concept
Van de Walle (2003) Free and fair
elections
Positive Universal Concept
Elklit & Reynolds
(2005)
Election quality Positive Universal &
particular
Process
Calingaert (2006) Election rigging Negative Universal Process
Lindberg (2006) Free and fair
elections
Positive Universal Concept
Birch (2011) Electoral
malpractice
Negative Universal Concept &
process
Hartlyn et al. (2008) Election quality Positive Universal Concept
Munck (2009)a Democratic
elections
Positive Universal Concept
Davis-Roberts &
Carroll (2010)
Democratic
elections
Positive Universal Concept &
process
Kelley & Kiril
(2010)
Election quality Positive Universal Concept &
process
Lo´pez-Pintor (2010) Electoral fraud Negative Universal Concept
Hyde & Marinov
(2012)
Competitive
elections
Positive Universal Concept
Norris (2012) Electoral integrity Positive Universal Concept
Donno (2013) Electoral
misconduct
Negative Universal Concept
Simpser (2013) Electoral
manipulation
Negative Universal Concept &
process
Notes: aMunck provides both a conceptualization of “electoral democracy” and “democratic elections”.
The conceptualization of “democratic elections” is more extensive and is therefore mentioned here.
However, data are not available for “democratic elections”, so the data used for this article are the
Electoral Democracy Index item on “clean elections”.56
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First, elections must be inclusive, [ . . . ] that is, all citizens must be effectively enabled
to exercise their right to vote in the electoral process; second; elections must be clean,
in other words, voters’ preferences must be respected and faithfully registered; third;
elections must be competitive, that is, they must offer the electorate an unbiased
choice among alternatives; and fourth; the main public offices must be accessed
through periodic elections, and the results expressed through the citizens’ votes
must not be reversed.17
Examples of negative definitions are Birch’s definition of electoral malpractice as
“the manipulation of electoral processes and outcomes so as to substitute personal
or partisan benefit for the public interest”, Lo´pez-Pintor’s notion of electoral fraud
as “any purposeful action taken to tamper with electoral activities and election-
related materials in order to affect the results of an election, which may interfere
with or thwart the will of the voters”, and Lehoucq’s conception of electoral
fraud as “clandestine efforts to shape election results”.18
Note that both positive and negative conceptualizations identify norms that
should be met for elections to have high integrity, or conversely, norms that
should be violated for elections to have low integrity. However, while positive
definitions focus on defining these norms, negative definitions emphasize
actors, intentionality, and –sometimes – the consequences for election outcomes.
For example, Birch’s and Schedler’s term “manipulation” implies actor(s)
involved in manipulating, as does Lo´pez-Pintor’s “purposeful action”.19 The
latter also stresses intentionality, that is, actions have to be purposeful, with the
aim to “shape the election results”.20 Hence, negative definitions emphasize
that “malpractice” or “fraud” should be delimited to those acts that are intention-
ally perpetuated with the aim to change the election results. Irregularities that
result from administrative incapacity are not to be considered as “malpractice”
or “fraud”. However, this poses both conceptual and measurement problems, as
first, it may be quite difficult to distinguish intentional actions from organizational
incapacity, and second, non-intentional irregularities (such as inaccurate voter
registration) can have significant consequences for election integrity. Hence,
even if measurement could reliably distinguish between intentional and non-
intentional irregularities, the question is whether the latter should be excluded
from the conceptualization of electoral integrity. In addition to intentionality,
some negative conceptualizations also consider whether irregularities affected
election outcomes. However, in terms of measurement validity this seems proble-
matic too, as the only way to gauge voters’ preferences is through the electoral
process and if the latter was flawed, observers have little possibility to know
what voters’ preferences were.
Hence, measurements of election integrity that are purely based on how fre-
quently irregularities occurred might generate more valid data. This implies that
positive conceptualizations may be preferable to negative conceptualizations,
not because such conceptualizations are inherently better, but because they
enable a broader conceptualization of election integrity that includes both inten-
tional and unintentional irregularities, and because the focus on the frequency of
718 C. van Ham
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irregularities (and not actors, intentions, or outcomes) may generate more valid
measurement.
A second aspect differentiating conceptualizations is whether they use univer-
sal or particular criteria to assess electoral integrity.21 While universal approaches
define the integrity of elections with reference to a universal democratic standard,
often based on democratic theory and/or international law, particular approaches
define the integrity of elections with reference to the citizens and parties involved.
An example of the latter is Pastor’s definition of a flawed election as “an election in
which some or all of the major political parties refuse to participate in the election
or reject the results” or Elklit and Reynolds’s assertion that: “The quality of an elec-
tion can [ . . . ] be conceptualized as the degree to which political actors at all levels
and from different political strands see the electoral process as legitimate and
binding.”22 The argument in favour of a particular approach is that elections are
different in different contexts, and even if the elections do not meet ideal demo-
cratic standards, it is ultimately up to domestic stakeholders to judge elections to
be acceptable or not. This approach seems especially useful for research using elec-
toral integrity as the independent variable, for example research seeking to explain
post-election events like protests or conflict. In this case, arguably citizen and elite
perceptions of the integrity of the electoral process are of interest, regardless of
whether these match the actual irregularities that occurred. However, for research
that is comparative and focuses on electoral integrity as the dependent variable,
using the same assessment criteria for all elections is important, and hence a uni-
versal approach seems more appropriate in this case.
A third important choice in the conceptualization of election integrity is
whether to take a process-based or concept-based approach, or a combination of
both.23 While concept-based approaches define the integrity of elections based
on ideal democratic standards (as discussed above), process-based conceptualiz-
ations consider the electoral process before, during, and after election day.
Examples of process-based conceptualizations are the frameworks for election
quality proposed by Elklit and Reynolds and electoral governance by Mozaffar
and Schedler.24 The advantage of process-based conceptualizations is that they
allow for precise measurement of election integrity. Elections are complex logisti-
cal operations, hence ordering the electoral process by the sequential steps taken
before, during, and after election day, helps to ensure that all relevant aspects are
taken into account. However, this approach runs the risk of generating vast “check-
lists” of indicators by which to judge elections, posing both practical difficulties in
terms of data collection as well as questions about how to evaluate the relative
importance of irregularities.25 Also, while process-based approaches draw on
ideal democratic standards to identify irregularities, these criteria remain rather
implicit in the evaluation of each step of the electoral process.
Some scholars combine process- and concept-based approaches. For example,
Elklit and Svensson propose a definition of “free and fair” elections based on
democratic theory and then proceed to develop a set of indicators that measures
“free- and fair-ness” before, during, and after elections.26 Other examples are
Democratization 719
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Schmeets who relates the seven Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) 1990 Copenhagen principles for democratic elections to irregula-
rities in the voting and counting process, Schedler traces the process of electoral
choice from the ex-ante formation of preferences and availability of choice to
the consequences of choice, and identifies possible strategies of manipulation at
each step, and Davis-Roberts and Carroll identify international law principles relat-
ing to elections and link them to the different stages of the electoral process.27 The
advantage of using a combination is that the benchmark against which elections are
evaluated is explicit (the advantage of concept-based approaches), while making
sure the entire electoral process is taken into consideration (the advantage of
process-based approaches).
Concluding, in terms of conceptualization, three choices appear to be conse-
quential for data on election integrity. Regarding positive or negative concepts,
positive conceptualizations may enable more valid measurement of election integ-
rity because they focus on the frequency of irregularities and not on actor intention-
ality or the consequences of irregularities for the election outcome. Regarding
universal or particular criteria, if the interest of the researcher is to explain cross-
country and over-time variation in electoral integrity, using universal criteria that
allow for cross-national comparison seems preferable. Finally, a combination of
concept- and process-based approaches may be preferable since it explicitly speci-
fies the criteria of evaluation while ensuring that the scope of the entire electoral
process is taken into account, improving both validity and reliability of
measurement.
2.2 Operationalizing electoral integrity: from concepts to indicators
When moving from concept to indicators, the core questions are which and how
many indicators to use, and whether those indicators adequately capture the
concept one wants to measure. While the previous section evaluated a broader
set of authors, in this section I discuss only a selection of authors that collected
empirical data on electoral integrity. This results in 11 data sets.28 Table 3 provides
an overview.
Ideally one would like to break up the concept of election integrity into multiple
indicators and measure each of these indicators separately, reducing measurement
error. However, as Table 3 demonstrates, six out of 11 data sets measure election
integrity using a single overall indicator. This is problematic because with a
single-indicator measure of election integrity it is not clear which aspects of the
electoral process are taken into account. In practice, overall judgements are prob-
ably based on a variety of indicators that are considered by coders but not coded
explicitly, that is, the aggregation of data is done in the coder’s mind. If different
authors have different indicators in mind and/or assign different weights to indi-
cators, this could lead to different overall scores of election integrity. For
example, if one author considers election violence to be more serious than
another, this will lead to systematic biases in overall scores of election integrity.
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Table 3. Measuring electoral integrity: operationalization and data collection.
Measurement
Operationalization Data collection
Author(s) Concept Indicators Sources Scale
Multiple
coders?
Anglin (1998) Free & fair
elections
Multiple 2 (2 main
attributes)
Author’s codinga Ordinal, 3
categories
No
Van de Walle
(2003)
Free & fair
elections
Single 1 overall
indicator
Journal of Democracy,
Africa South of the Sahara
(Europa Guide, various
years), Nohlen et al. (2000),
Author’s files.
Ordinal, 3
categories
No
Lindberg (2006)b Free & fair
elections
Single 1 overall
indicator
Election observation reports Ordinal, 4
categories
No
News/media sources
Historical information
Country experts
Birch (2011) Electoral
malpractice
Multiple 14 (3 main
attributes &
14 components
of attributes)
Election observation reports Ordinal, 5
categories
Yes
Hartlyn, McCoy
& Mustillo
(2008)c Election
quality
Single 1 overall
indicator
Election observation reports,
if no election mission,
then news sources validated
by country experts
Ordinal, 3
categories
Yes
Munck (2009) Clean
elections
Single 1 overall
indicator
Country experts Ordinal, 3
categories
No
(Continued )
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Table 3. Continued.
Measurement
Operationalization Data collection
Author(s) Concept Indicators Sources Scale
Multiple
coders?
Kelley and Kiril
(2010 QED)
Election
quality
Multiple 7 (3 main attributes
& 7 components
of attributes)
US State Department Country
Reports on Human Rights
Ordinal, 3/4
categories
Yes
Hyde and Marinov
(2012)d
Competitive
elections
Multiple 7 (1 overall indicator,
6 specific
indicators)
Election observation reports Dichotomous Yes
Academic data handbooks
News and historical information
Donno (2013)e Electoral
misconduct
Single 1 overall indicator Election observation reports Dichotomous &
Ordinal, 3
categories
Yes
News sources
NELDA data
Schedler (2013)d Electoral
manipulation
Single 1 overall indicator Election observation reports Ordinal, 3
categories
Yes
News/media sources
Validated by country experts
Simpser (2013) Electoral
manipulation
Multiple 12 specific
indicators
Election observation reports Ordinal, 4
categories
Yes
Academic data handbooks
News and NGO reports
Notes: aAnglin did not specify exactly which sources he used, but notes that scores were based on “a judgmental basis following a close study of available reports
and opinions”.57
bLindberg provides a broader definition of the “quality of elections” based on the attributes of participation, competition and legitimacy. However, since his definition
considers the outcomes of elections such as turnout as well, I use the specific “free & fairness” indicator here.
cNote that Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo use multiple sources, but only if election observation reports are not available. Hence, the majority of elections are coded
using a single source, either election observation reports or news reports.
dNote that the data from Hyde and Marinov and Schedler are not primarily aimed at measuring election integrity, but include variables relating to election integrity.
Hyde and Marinov include six questions about aspects of election integrity, and Schedler includes an indicator of electoral fraud. See Table C in the online Appendix.58
eNote that Donno includes three variables on electoral misconduct, one based on election observation reports only and two based on multiple sources. Since the latter
are both partly based on NELDA data, they are not included in the analyses.59
722
C
.
van
H
am
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
e
i
t
 
T
w
e
n
t
e
]
 
a
t
 
0
4
:
4
0
 
1
6
 
J
u
l
y
 
2
0
1
5
 
In addition, single indicator measures do not allow researchers to evaluate
whether all relevant indicators are included. For example, Anglin shows that
measures of election integrity tend to be focused on election day, neglecting irre-
gularities in the period before the elections.29 If the increased frequency and effec-
tiveness of electionmonitoring has led “efforts by entrenched leaders to manipulate
electoral processes [ . . . ] to become more subtle”, shifting irregularities to the
period before the elections, data that do not take into account the pre-election
environment might seriously underestimate the extent of irregularities.30 More-
over, single-indicator measures of electoral integrity are also problematic if there
is a trade-off between different types of irregularities. If specific irregularities are
positively correlated, measuring election integrity with a smaller set of indicators
or even a single indicator might increase measurement error, but will nevertheless
still tap part of the concept of interest. If, however, certain irregularities are nega-
tively correlated (as when there is a trade-off between irregularities before and
during election day), separate indicators are needed for pre-election and election
day irregularities in order to measure the concept accurately.
Using multiple indicators to measure election integrity is hence preferable to
decrease measurement error and more accurately measure irregularities in
various parts of the electoral process. However, this requires a higher investment
of resources in data gathering (and data sources that provide precise enough infor-
mation). Examples of multi-indicator approaches are the data gathered by Anglin,
Birch, Kelley and Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, and Simpser.31
2.3 Collecting data on electoral integrity: from indicators to data
This section evaluates the data collection process. Here, the core questions are (a)
the sources on which data are based, (b) the level of measurement, and (c) the pro-
cedures used to gather data.
For data collection, the most important factor determining data quality are the
sources of information used. Sources vary from election observation reports to
news media, historical sources, complaints filed by political parties, surveys, eth-
nographic research, and evaluations by country experts.32 Distinctions can be
made between “partisan” and “non-partisan” sources, or between “subjective”
and “objective” sources.33 Lehoucq defines complaints filed by political parties
or newspaper accounts as partisan sources, while considering assessments of elec-
tion irregularities by citizens or country experts as non-partisan.34 Hartlyn and
McCoy distinguish between subjective sources, that is, actors that participate in
the electoral process like citizens and parties, and objective sources, that is, obser-
vers of the electoral process like news media, country experts, and election obser-
vers.35 However, whether considered partisan or subjective, all these sources are
likely to have some degree of bias. Newspapers may have different ideological
orientations and links to political parties, and hence data based on newspaper
accounts should take this into account. Citizens have a stake in elections depending
on their political orientation, and hence surveys and ethnographic research should
Democratization 723
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include citizens from different political orientations in order to obtain balanced
information. With country experts too, researchers are probably well advised to
consult multiple experts and be aware of their political orientations. Finally, elec-
tion observation missions have been found to suffer from biases as well, as dis-
cussed below.
In addition to partisanship or subjectivity, other sources of bias may be incom-
plete geographical or temporal coverage. For example, citizens are only able to
report on irregularities that occurred in their surroundings, requiring good geo-
graphical coverage of surveys. Likewise, news media might only have limited
access in certain parts of the country and election observation missions cannot
be physically present in each and every polling station (and in fact often only
cover a fraction of polling stations).36 Though less obvious perhaps, temporal cov-
erage of sources is also a problem. For example, coding elections that occurred in
the 1970s and 1980s makes reliance on election observation mission reports less
viable since missions were not that common at the time, and collecting good infor-
mation on electoral conduct based on news resources in that period may be more
challenging as well.37
As international election observation missions have become so common since
the 1990s, election observation reports constitute the source most commonly used
in data sets on electoral integrity (seven out of 11 data sets). Moreover, often news
media reports and academic sources build on international observer assessments in
their own analyses of elections. Hence, examining potential biases of this source in
more detail is important. Considering partisan bias, missions from intergovern-
mental organizations (IGOs) with less democratic member states tend to be
more lenient in their assessments than IGOs with more democratic member
states and NGOs. This is why most researchers use data from missions that
apply stricter norms in their election assessments such as the OSCE, the EU, the
OAS and the Carter Centre, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), or the Inter-
national Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).38 Certain types of elections are
also judged differently. As such, international election observers seem to be less
critical in “founding elections, elections that lead to alternation in power or estab-
lish peace after civil wars”, and in elections that demonstrate an improvement com-
pared to previous elections.39 This suggests that “the overall assessment of the
election may in some cases be less informative than the sub-components whose
evaluation is typically embedded in the reports’ details”, that are less prone to
such bias.40
An easy solution for measuring electoral integrity in an accurate, non-partisan
way is unlikely to exist. However, a possibility for reducing source bias in
measurement would be to use multiple data sources. This might be a good way
of “balancing” sources so as to limit partisan bias and increase temporal and geo-
graphic coverage, and this is indeed the strategy followed by Anglin, Van deWalle,
Lindberg, Hyde and Marinov, Donno, Schedler, and Simpser.41
Regarding measurement level, Table 3 shows that scales vary from dichoto-
mous distinctions between flawed and non-flawed elections to more fine-grained
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distinctions of three–five ordinal categories. These may seem quite coarse
measurement levels, however, as Munck and Verkuilen emphasize, fine-grained
distinctions are only preferable if the sources on which scores are based provide
sufficient information to make these distinctions.42 Given the oft-limited coverage
of the sources used to score elections, using ordinal scales that vary between three
and five categories seems quite reasonable. When multiple indicators are
measured, the scales used are often ordinal scales with four–five categories that
range from low to high presence of irregularities. For example, Birch codes indi-
cators on a five-point scale ranging from “lowest degree of malpractice” to
“highest degree of malpractice” and Kelley and Kiril use a four-point scale from
“no problems” to “major problems”. Single-indicator judgements of election integ-
rity mostly use a three-point classification to distinguish between elections with
severe irregularities, elections with less severe irregularities, and elections
without irregularities.43
Finally, evaluating data collection involves, apart from sources and measure-
ment level, an assessment of the coding process. Here, the use of multiple
coders, clear coding scales, and documentation of coding procedures, as well as
access to replication data, are important. If data gathering is done by various
coders, inter-coder reliability scores give an indication of differences between
coders and provide a margin of error that can be taken into account in subsequent
analyses. This was done by seven out of 11 data sets. In terms of coding scales,
scores along the scale are generally made explicit and explained well. Moreover,
most studies provide clear documentation of the coding process and access to repli-
cation data.
Summarizing, most data sets measure election integrity based on a single over-
arching indicator using a single source of information. Only five out of 11 data sets
measure election integrity with multiple indicators (Anglin, Birch, Kelley and
Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, Simpser); seven out of 11 studies use multiple sources
to measure election integrity (Anglin, Van de Walle, Lindberg, Hyde and
Marinov, Donno, Schedler, Simpser); and seven out of 11 studies use multiple
coders to code elections and report inter-coder reliability scores (Birch, Hartlyn,
McCoy, and Mustillo, Kelley and Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, Donno, Schedler,
Simpser).44
3. Which elections are difficult to measure?
The previous section discussed how the different data sets on election integrity
conceptualized and measured election integrity. This provides substantive
reasons to prefer some data sets over others, to which I will return in the conclusion.
However, would it be possible to evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the data sets discussed here empirically? Unfortunately, an objective or “true”
measure of election integrity that could be used as an external benchmark to evalu-
ate how well the different data sets tap election integrity does not exist.45
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Instead, this section analyses the extent to which different data sets disagree
about the election integrity of the same elections, attempting to identify the
sources of disagreement.46 Here, data sets are considered as repeated measure-
ments of election integrity, and variance in election integrity scores (that is, dis-
agreement), is considered as indicating potential measurement error. If
measurement error is non-random, identifying its sources can provide clues
about how to improve future data.47
Now, variance in election integrity scores may be caused by the choices made
in terms of conceptualization, operationalization, and data collection discussed in
Section 2, most notably whether authors scored elections based on (a) frequency of
irregularities versus intentionality and/or outcome effects, (b) multiple indicators
versus single indicators, (c) multiple sources versus single sources, and (d) multiple
coders versus single coders. In addition, it may also be the case that certain types of
elections are more difficult to code, generating higher variance in election integrity
scores. For example, election integrity scores for elections in the early years of the
third wave, that is, the 1970s and 1980s, might generate higher disagreement
because often less information is available about the conduct of these elections.
Also, the first elections that took place just after the transition to de jure multi-
party elections might have higher variance in electoral integrity scores. Likewise,
elections that took place after civil war or coup d’e´tat might stir more disagreement
among researchers. Also, if a country has been holding elections for a longer period
of time, those elections might be better documented, easing the assessment of elec-
tion integrity. Moreover, elections with medium levels of election integrity might
be elections on which there is more disagreement, since differences in coding
between authors might become most apparent in this middle category of not-
clearly-rigged but not-entirely-clean elections. Finally, I evaluated whether there
was any difference in disagreement depending on the number of times an election
was coded (that is, how many data sets coded the election), region, and election
type (constituent assembly, legislative, and executive elections).
To test these hypotheses, data on electoral integrity from the 11 data sets eval-
uated in Section 2 were used. This resulted in a sample of 746 elections with two or
more election integrity scores in 95 third and fourth wave regimes in Southern
Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, sub-Saharan
Africa, South America, and Central America from 1974 until 2009.48 To construct
the measure of disagreement, all election integrity scores were recoded to vary
from zero to one, running from low integrity to high integrity. For the data sets
that included multiple indicators, I took the average of all specific indicators to
create an overall election integrity score.49 Elections that were scored exactly the
same were coded as “agreed”. For the remaining elections, since the different
data sets use different coding scales, we need to differentiate disagreement based
on mere differences in coding scales from disagreement about the actual election
integrity score. The least fine-grained scale used to score electoral integrity is a
three-point ordinal scale.50 On a scale ranging from zero to one, this means that
the scale differentiates elections with low integrity (0–0.33), medium integrity
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(0.33–0.66), and high integrity (0.66–1). Hence, I coded elections that received
electoral integrity scores within the same category, that is, elections that received
scores between 0 and 0.33; between 0.33 and 0.66, and between 0.66 and 1 as
“low disagreement”. Elections that were scored in multiple categories, for
example twice receiving a score of 0.5 and once of 1, were coded as “high disagree-
ment”. Table 4 shows the results.
Of the 746 elections that were coded by more than one data set, 14% received
the same election integrity score. Another 27% received different election integrity
scores, but scores that were within the same election integrity category (that is,
between 0 and 0.33; 0.33 and 0.66; or 0.66 and 1), indicating low disagreement
that could have been driven simply by the use of different coding scales. For
59% of elections however, disagreement was higher, as authors coded elections
in different categories of election integrity, substantially disagreeing about the
level of integrity in these elections.
Now, do choices made in terms of conceptualization, operationalization, and
data collection affect disagreement about electoral integrity? The second row of
Table 4 shows the difference in disagreement between elections coded only on
the basis of frequency of irregularities, and elections coded both on the basis of
intentionality/outcome consequences and the frequency of irregularities (the
“mixed” category). Since the Kelley and Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, as well as
Simpser data sets provide election integrity data for most elections and measure
the frequency of irregularities, there are no elections that were only coded by
authors using intentionality as a criterion. However, we can compare the mixed cat-
egory with the category that is purely based on frequency of irregularities, and this
seems to indicate a quite marked difference in disagreement. If elections are purely
scored on the basis of the frequency of irregularities, disagreement about electoral
integrity scores is very low for most elections: over 80% of elections are in the
“agreed” and “low disagreement” category. For only 17% of elections there is
strong disagreement between authors, compared to 68% of the elections that are
coded by a mix of approaches. A similar picture emerges considering the
number of indicators: clearly, if elections were coded using multiple indicators
for electoral integrity, disagreement is substantially lower than if elections were
coded using a mix of single and multiple indicators.51 Turning to sources, there
are only a few elections that are coded only by data sets using multiple sources,
leaving most elections in the mixed category. Hence, it is difficult to evaluate
the consequences of the use of multiple or single sources. Finally, comparing the
use of multiple coders versus a single coder appears to indicate that disagreement
about electoral integrity is substantially lower for elections coded by multiple
coders (again compared to the mixed category). Concluding, the substantive
reasons to prefer measurements of election integrity that are based on frequency
of irregularities, multiple indicators, and multiple coders seem to be supported
by the descriptive findings reported here. A note of caution is in order however:
in the data sets evaluated here, the first two measurement choices are often made
in conjunction, making it hard to separate the effect of each individually.52
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Table 4. Explaining disagreement about election integrity scores.
Agreed Low disagreement High disagreement Total
All elections 14% (102) 27% (203) 59% (441) 746 (100%)
Conceptualization
Frequency of irregularities 43% (57) 40% (53) 17% (22) 100% (132)
Mix 7% (45) 24% (148) 68% (419) 100% (612)
Intentionality/affected outcome 0 2 0 2
Indicators
Multiple 40% (57) 42% (59) 18% (25) 100% (141)
Mix 7% (45) 24% (143) 69% (412) 100% (600)
Single 0 1 4 5
Sources
Multiple 36% (12) 21% (7) 42% (14) 100% (33)
Mix 13% (90) 27% (192) 60% (427) 100% (709)
Single 0 4 0 4
Coders
Multiple 20% (67) 36% (120) 45% (151) 100% (338)
Mix 9% (35) 20% (82) 71% (285) 100% (402)
Single 0 1 5 6
Number of data sets coded
2 31% (39) 38% (48) 32% (40) 100% (127)
3 26% (38) 36% (53) 38% (56) 100% (147)
4 11% (16) 30% (44) 59% (85) 100% (145)
5 3% (5) 19% (33) 78% (133) 100% (171)
6 4% (4) 13% (15) 83% (93) 100% (112)
7 0% (0) 24% (9) 76% (29) 100% (38)
8 0 1 5 6
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Level of electoral integrity
Low integrity 2% (1) 16% (8) 82% (40) 100% (49)
Medium integrity 0% (0) 10% (17) 90% (160) 100% (177)
High integrity 19% (101) 34% (178) 46% (241) 100% (520)
Election in early years
1970s/1980s 26% (35) 38% (53) 36% (50) 100% (138)
1990s/2000s 11% (67) 25% (150) 64% (391) 100% (608)
First elections
First elections 8% (9) 25% (27) 67% (72) 100% (108)
Later elections 15% (93) 28% (176) 58% (369) 100% (638)
Democratic experience
,5 elections held in country 11% (55) 24% (123) 65% (335) 100% (513)
.5 elections held in country 20% (47) 34% (80) 45% (106) 100% (233)
Elections after conflict
Post-conflict elections 0% (0) 15% (14) 85% (81) 100% (95)
Other elections 16% (102) 29% (188) 55% (360) 100% (650)
Elections after coup d’e´tat
Post-coup elections 0% (0) 21% (6) 79% (22) 100% (28)
Other elections 14% (102) 27% (197) 58% (419) 100% (718)
Election type
Constituent assembly elections 0% (0) 38% (5) 62% (8) 100% (13)
Legislative elections 15% (65) 29% (124) 56% (241) 100% (430)
Presidential elections 12% (37) 24% (74) 63% (192) 100% (303)
Region
Central and Eastern Europe 18% (19) 43% (46) 39% (42) 100% (107)
Former Soviet republics 6% (5) 17% (15) 77% (67) 100% (87)
Sub-Saharan Africa 3% (8) 7% (19) 90% (241) 100% (268)
South America 19% (29) 54% (82) 27% (41) 100% (152)
Central America 14% (14) 35% (34) 51% (50) 100% (98)
Southern Europe 79% (27) 21% (7) 0% (0) 100% (34)
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Turning to the other factors, I find substantial effects only for the number of
times the election was coded, the level of election integrity, post-conflict elections,
and region. Regarding the number of times an election is coded, the most important
difference appears between elections that were coded two or three times, and those
that were coded more often: disagreement is markedly higher in elections coded by
more than three data sets. Concerning the level of election integrity (measured as
the average election integrity score of all data sets that coded that election), our
expectation that elections of medium integrity would have highest disagreement
is only partially borne out by the data. Rather, it seems that there is little disagree-
ment about elections with high election integrity, and disagreement is much higher
for elections of both medium and low integrity. Regarding the possible temporal
bias in election integrity scores, I expected early elections to have higher disagree-
ment because information about integrity is relatively more difficult to find,
however this appears not to be the case: in fact, agreement about early years elec-
tions is higher. Concerning first elections and democratic experience, disagreement
appears to be slightly higher in first elections and in countries that have had rela-
tively few elections, but also here the differences are not very large. Turning to the
influence of conflict and coups d’e´tat on election integrity judgements, election
integrity in post-conflict elections does appear to be more contested, as disagree-
ment is markedly higher for those elections. This is also the case for elections
having taken place after a coup d’e´tat, but the difference is less marked (the
number of post-coup elections is also quite small). Finally, election integrity
appears especially difficult to code for elections in former Soviet republics and
sub-Saharan Africa, while appearing easier to code in Southern Europe. This
finding may be driven by the lower levels of election integrity in the former two
regions, and (especially in former Soviet republics) also by the fact that election
integrity is often undermined by attempts to tilt the level playing field in the
period well before elections, constituting irregularities that are relatively more dif-
ficult to detect.53
4. Conclusion
While elections have become common practice around the world, the integrity of
elections varies greatly. Mapping the “menu of manipulation” that undermines
electoral integrity is hence increasingly important.54 This article compared cross-
national data sets on election integrity, evaluating how they conceptualize and
measure election integrity.
In terms of conceptualization, election integrity is a complex concept, and the
way authors choose to conceptualize it will depend on their specific research pur-
poses. For large N comparative research on election integrity, using a positive con-
ceptualization of election integrity based on universal criteria and combining a
concept- and process-based approach, seems preferable. This is because it
allows researchers to specify criteria for measurement of election integrity that
are explicit, can be validly measured, and are cross-nationally comparable.
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However, researchers that are specifically interested in intentional electoral fraud
may find negative conceptualizations more useful, and researchers studying elec-
tion integrity in small N research or as an independent variable may prefer using
particular criteria. In terms of measurement, I contend that operationalizing elec-
tion integrity using multiple indicators is preferable as elections are complex logis-
tical processes and electoral malpractice takes “a panoply of forms”.55 Hence,
multiple indicators allow for more precise and valid measurement of election integ-
rity. In addition, gathering data using multiple sources and multiple coders miti-
gates measurement bias, improving both validity and reliability of election
integrity data.
The article concluded with an empirical analysis of 11 cross-national data sets,
analysing the sources of disagreement about election integrity. I find that for elec-
tions coded on the basis of the frequency of irregularities (and not assumed inten-
tionality or consequences for the election outcome), disagreement about election
integrity is substantially lower. I also find that disagreement was lower for elections
coded using multiple indicators. The findings for using multiple coders and sources
were less clear, however there are still good substantive reasons to believe that elec-
tion integrity data collected using multiple sources and multiple coders improves
measurement validity and reliability. Other factors that affected disagreement
about election integrity were the number of times elections were coded (more
scores corresponding to higher disagreement), the level of election integrity (elec-
tions of lower integrity generated stronger disagreement), post-conflict elections
and elections in former Soviet republics and sub-Saharan Africa.
What are the implications of these findings for future research on electoral
integrity? For researchers without the resources to gather data themselves, there
are good substantive reasons to prefer data sets that measure election integrity
using multiple indicators and multiple sources. The data sets developed by
Birch, Kelley and Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, and Simpser come closest to these
ideals, but all have limitations. All four measure specific irregularities, though
Birch more extensively than the other three authors. However, only Hyde and
Marinov as well as Simpser use multiple sources to measure election integrity
(yet they measure a more limited set of irregularities). The best alternative seems
to combine these data sets and use them as repeated measurements of election
integrity. This approach provides researchers with an estimate of the margin of
error for each election, and also allows researchers to gather additional information
for elections on which disagreement about election integrity is high.
For researchers aiming to gather new data on election integrity, careful con-
sideration of the research goals is important, and different choices may be prefer-
able depending on the scope of the research (in-depth country study or large N
comparative research) and the research questions asked (is election integrity the
independent or dependent variable). In this article I have argued that for the pur-
poses of large N comparative research seeking to explain election integrity, expli-
cit, universal criteria that can be validly measured are preferable. New data sets
could improve the validity and reliability of election integrity data by using such
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criteria, and subsequently measure election integrity on the basis of multiple indi-
cators and sources. Thereby data on specific types of irregularities as well as the
frequency, timing, and geographical spread of irregularities can be expanded.
This would not only allow for more valid and reliable measurement of election
integrity, but also enable more in-depth analysis of its causal dynamics. Getting
elections right is not easy, and getting the measurement of election integrity
right probably even less so. However, given the importance of elections for democ-
racy, it is an effort well worth undertaking.
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4. Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation.”
5. For conceptualization, see ibid. and: Elklit and Svensson, “WhatMakes Elections Free
and Fair”; Elklit, “Electoral Institutional Change”; Mozaffar and Schedler, “Electoral
Governance”; Lehoucq, “Electoral Fraud”; Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in
Africa; Munck, Measuring Democracy; Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections;
Davis-Roberts and Carroll, “Using International Law”; European Commission, Com-
pendium of International Standards; Lo´pez-Pintor, Assessing Electoral Fraud;
Schmeets, “Vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen.” For measurement, see: Elklit and Rey-
nolds, “A Framework of Election Quality”; Darnolf, Assessing Electoral Fraud;
and note 6 below.
6. Anglin, “International Election Monitoring”; Van de Walle, “Presidentialism and Cli-
entelism in Africa”; Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa; Birch, Electoral
Malpractice; Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo, “Electoral Governance Matters”;
Munck, Measuring Democracy; Kelley and Kiril, “Election Quality”; Hyde and
Marinov, “Which Elections Can Be Lost?”; Donno, Defending Democratic Norms;
Simpser, Why Governments Manipulate Elections; Schedler, Politics of Uncertainty.
7. Building on Adcock and Collier, “Measurement Validity”; and Munck and Verkuilen,
“Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy.”
8. Munck and Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy,” 15.
9. Carmines and Zeller, Reliability and Validity Assessment.
10. If authors use multiple indicators, the scope and internal consistency of the operatio-
nalization, and weighting and aggregation are also important. See Munck and Verkui-
len, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy.” However, since few authors have
collected data based on elaborate conceptualizations (see Table A in the online Appen-
dix), these aspects are not further discussed.
11. See Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” 37.
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12. Most of this research focuses on third wave regimes, however election integrity is also
relevant for established democracies (see Alvarez, Hall, and Hyde, Election Fraud).
Of the data sets reviewed here, only Kelley and Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, and
Simpser (see note 6) measure election integrity in established democracies, hence
the focus in this article is on third wave regimes.
13. For reasons of parsimony, this article does not discuss the content of conceptualiz-
ations, but rather focuses on the “meta-conceptual” choices and their consequences
for measurement of electoral integrity. For an overview of conceptualizations, see
the online Appendix, Table A.
14. The distinction between “positive” and “negative” concepts derives from Berlin’s
work on positive and negative liberty (Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”). Note
that while conceptualizations of election integrity differ in this respect, measurement
indicators tend to focus on norm-violations (see Section 2.2).
15. Elklit and Svensson, “What Makes Elections Free and Fair”; Anglin, “International
Election Monitoring”; Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa; Munck,
Measuring Democracy; O’Donnell, “Democracy, Law and Comparative Politics”;
Elklit and Reynolds, “A Framework of Election Quality”; Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mus-
tillo, “Electoral Governance Matters”; Kelley and Kiril, “Election Quality”; Norris,
“Global Norms of Integrity?”
16. Pastor, “The Role of Electoral Administration”; Birch, Electoral Malpractice; Donno,
Defending Democratic Norms; Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation”; Lehoucq,
“Electoral Fraud”; Lo´pez-Pintor, Assessing Electoral Fraud; Simpser, Why Govern-
ments Manipulate Elections; Calingaert “Election Rigging.”
17. Munck, Measuring Democracy, 88.
18. Birch, Electoral Malpractice, 23; Lo´pez-Pintor, Assessing Electoral Fraud, 9;
Lehoucq, “Electoral Fraud,” 233.
19. See notes 4 and 5 above.
20. See note 18 above.
21. Hartlyn and McCoy refer to this distinction as “quality-based” versus “legitimacy-
based.” Hartlyn and McCoy, “Observer Paradoxes.”
22. Pastor, “The Role of Electoral Administration,” 15; Elklit and Reynolds, “Judging
Elections,” 189. Another approach using “particular” criteria is Lehoucq’s legal con-
ception of electoral fraud, that is, acts are fraudulent if they break the national law.
However, not only can electoral legislation itself be flawed, cross-national compar-
ability is also a problem here. See note 20.
23. Elklit and Svensson, “What Makes Elections Free and Fair.”
24. See note 5 above.
25. Mozaffar and Schedler, “Electoral Governance.”
26. See note 5 above.
27. See notes 5 and 6 above.
28. Survey data measuring citizens’ and experts’ perceptions of electoral integrity are
excluded, due to their limited coverage of time periods. See Birch, Electoral Malprac-
tice; Norris, “Global Norms of Integrity?”; and Bland, Green, and Moore, “Measuring
the Quality of Election Administration.” Assessments of electoral integrity based on
“election forensics” are also excluded since these methods tend to be applied to
single countries, and are hence less useful for comparative research. See Alvarez,
Hall, and Hyde, Election Fraud; Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin, Forensics of Elec-
tion Fraud. Finally, a number of comparative data sets are excluded due to (a) limited
time coverage, (b) limited data availability, or (c) large numbers of false negatives.
Regarding the first, the Freedom House and Economist Intelligence Unit’s “electoral
process” indicators have only been available since 2006. Regarding the second, Elklit
and Reynolds’s (excellent multiple source, multiple indicator) data on election quality
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are only available for 19 elections, of which only nine match our sample of third wave
regimes. Also, Pastor’s data reported in his 1999 article only include flawed elections,
omitting the remainder of the sample; and Schmeets collected extensive multi-indi-
cator data on election integrity based on the election observation reports of the
OSCE; however these data are not publicly available. Finally, the fraud indicator in
the Database of Political Institutions was excluded due to a large number of false nega-
tives. See Birch, Electoral Malpractice; Schmeets, “Vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen”;
and notes 5 and 16.
29. Anglin, “International Election Monitoring.”
30. Carothers, “The Observers Observed,” 22.
31. See note 6 above. For an overview of specific indicators and coding scales used, see
the online Appendix, Table C.
32. Birch, Electoral Malpractice; Lehoucq, “Electoral Fraud.”
33. Lehoucq, “Electoral Fraud”; Hartlyn and McCoy, “Observer Paradoxes.”
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair.
37. Moreover, critics noted the unprofessionalism of election observers in the early 1990s.
See Geisler, “Vagaries of Election Observations”; Carothers, “The Observers
Observed.” By the end of the 1990s international election observation missions
(most notably those organized by the OSCE, EU (European Union), OAS (Organiz-
ation of American States), and international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs)), significantly improved their observation methodology. See Bjornlund,
Beyond Free and Fair; Hyde, “Catch Us If You Can.” However, this implies that
data based on election observation reports of elections in the 1980s and early 1990s
might be less accurate.
38. Kelley, “D-Minus Elections.”
39. Donno, “Who Is Punished?” 26.
40. Birch, Electoral Malpractice, 71.
41. See note 6 above.
42. See note 7 above.
43. See online Appendix, Table C.
44. See note 6 above.
45. Democracy indices such as Polity or Freedom House could be used as an external
benchmark, however that would mean using a more encompassing and less precise
measure to benchmark the validity of election integrity data.
46. Readers interested in dataset-by-dataset comparisons are referred to Van Ham,
“Beyond Electoralism?”
47. This approach follows a procedure common in evaluating the validity of expert
surveys, where experts are considered as providing “repeated measurements” of an
underlying concept, for example party positions, and variance in answers between
experts is considered to indicate potential measurement error. See Steenbergen and
Marks, “Evaluating Expert Judgments.”
48. Of these 746 elections, 17% was coded by two data sets, 20% by three, 19% by four,
23% by five, 15% by six, and 6% by seven or eight authors. Note that the sample of
elections analysed here only includes elections that formally met international stan-
dards for elections, that is, de jure multi-party/candidate and universal suffrage. See
Van Ham, “Beyond Electoralism?” For the empirical scope of each data set, see
online Appendix, Table B.
49. See online Appendix, Table C.
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50. Hyde and Marinov use a dichotomous score to code the presence of specific irregula-
rities, but since I take the average of six specific indicators, the election integrity score
becomes quasi-continuous. See note 6 above.
51. Note that also here, given the large amount of elections coded by Kelley and Kiril,
Hyde and Marinov, and Simpser, there are very few elections that were coded
purely by single-indicator data sets, leaving only the mixed category for comparison.
See note 6 above.
52. The bivariate correlation between intentionality and indicators is 0.92. Hence, in the
multivariate models shown in Table D of the online Appendix, the effects of these vari-
ables were estimated separately.
53. To test which of these explanatory factors have a robust effect on disagreement about
election integrity scores, I estimated ordinal logit models predicting disagreement
about election integrity. The results of these models are shown in Table D of the
online Appendix, and demonstrate that intentionality, the number of indicators,
number of times the election was coded, the level of election integrity, post-conflict
elections, and region significantly explain disagreement about election integrity.
54. See Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation.”
55. Lehoucq, “Electoral Fraud,” 233.
56. Munck, Measuring Democracy, 83.
57. Anglin, “International Election Monitoring,” 481.
58. Hyde andMarinov, “Which Elections Can Be Lost?”; and Schedler, Politics of Uncer-
tainty, 407.
59. Donno, Defending Democratic Norms, 54–5.
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